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SITUS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF
TAXATION
Necessity for Taxing Personal Property: One of the objec-
tions to a system of taxation is the ease with which it may be
dodged by the taxpayer, or, to be more accurate, the supposed
taxpayer. If any considerable portion of the property subject to
taxation may by secreting from the assessor escape taxation, this
means that the property which is taxed must bear more than its
fair share of the burden. This gives the dishonest property
owner, the tax dodger, an advantage over the honest taxpayer. In
other words, it puts a premium upon dishonesty and cleverness in
secreting property from the gaze of the assessor. The form of
property in which this can be successfully done is personal prop-
erty. In the case of real estate, the ownership of which must
be a matter of record and the locality a constant one, secreting
from the assessor is impossible and tax dodging is limited to
under valuation. For this reason, many favor the tax on real
property as a more workable system of taxation than any other,
and the extremist, the single taxer, insists that it should be applied
to the exclusion of all other forms of property tax. But with
the rapid increase in the value of personal property, due in large
part to the growth of corporations, some of which, e. g., insurance
companies and express companies, have millions of dollars' worth
of personal property and practically no real estate, the propaganda
of the single taxer has been confined to academic discussion and
stands little chance of being adopted by taxing bodies. That per-
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sonal property must for some time at least continue subject to
taxation may be taken as an established fact. It is therefore
necessary to meet and solve as best we may the difficulties in the
way of applying a system of taxation to this transitory and more
or less elusive and evanescent form of property.
Forms of Personal Property: For purposes of taxation we
may divide personal property into two forms, tangible and intang-
ible. The former being corporeal, such as live stock, implements,
merchandise, is much less readily secreted than the latter, which
consists of such property as shares of stock in corporations, notes,
debts, and choses in action in general. From the standpoint of
taxation the latter have therefore presented the greatest difficulty,
and -our attention will for that reason be given mainly to these.
Mobilia Seqituntur Personam: The common law fiction that
movables follow the person and that therefore they should be
taxed at the domicile of the owner has caused no small amount
of confusion because of the inherent difficulty in applying it and
the tendency upon the part -of some courts to force to the point
of interfering with justice a mere fiction which could have been
intended merely as a means of furthering justice. If an assessor
finds a herd of cattle permanently located within his taxing dis-
trict on the date when the assessment roll is completed, it does
not accord with common sense to say that he shall not assess them
unless he can find that the owner is domiciled within the district,
rather than leave their assessment to the assessor in the district
where the owner is domiciled, which assessor will in all prob-
ability not know anything of the existence of the herd, provided
the owner is not truthful enough to report the fact. It can readily
be seen that a strict adherence to this fiction would greatly facili-
tate the escape of a vast amount of personal property from
assessment anywhere.
Story's View: In discussing this fiction, Justice Story says:
"The exceptions to the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam have
become so numerous that it cannot be safely invoked for the deci-
sion of any but the simplest cases at the present day; if indeed a
case can ever be safely decided upon a maxim. The exceptions
would probably be less frequent if the maxim were lex situs
mobilia regit."'
View of the Supreme Court. In discussing this same ques-
tion the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through
'Conflict of Laws, 8th Ed., p. 543 (a).
SITUS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR TAXATION 219
Chief Justice Waite, says: "The power of taxation by any state
is limited to persons, property, or business within its jurisdiction.
Personal property, in the absence of any law to the contrary,
follows the person of the owner, and has its situs at his domicile.
But for the purposes of taxation, it may be separated from him,
and he may be taxed on its account at the place where it is actually
located. These are familiar principles, and have often been acted
upon in this court and in the courts of Illinois. If the state has
actual jurisdiction of the person of the owner, it operates directly
upon him. If he is absent, and it has jurisdiction of his prop-
erty, it operates upon him through his property." 2 And in a
later case, the court, speaking through Justice Bradley, says: "If
the owner of personal property within a state resides in another
state which taxes him for that property as part of his general
estate attached to his person, this action of the latter state does
not in the least affect the right of the state in which the property
is situated to tax it also. It is hardly necessary to cite authorities
on a point so elementary." 3 And in a still later case, Justice Gray,
in delivering the opinion of the court, discusses the origin and
decadence ,of the fiction with a conciseness leaving nothing to be
desired: "The old rule, expressed in the maxim mobilia sequun-
tur personam, by which personal property was regarded as subject
to the law of the owner's domicile, grew up in the Middle Ages,
when movable property consisted chiefly of gold and jewels,
which could be easily carried by the owner from place to place,
or secreted in spots known only to himself. In modern times,
since the great increase in the amount and variety of personal
property, not immediately connected with the person of the owner,
that rule has yielded more and more to the le., situs, the law of the
place where the property is kept and used."4
Reasons for Departure from the Fiction: It may therefore be
taken as an established rule pf American law that personal prop-
erty may acquire a situs of its own for the purpose of taxation.
Nor are there wanting sufficient practical reasons why this
should be so. When property of any kind is located in a state,
legal protection must be given to it by that state. This protec-
tion may involve considerable expense and it follows that the
2 Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, (1873) 19 Wall. (U. S.) 490,
499, 22 L. Ed. 189.
3 Coe v. Errol, (1886) 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. Ed. 715, 6 S. C. R. 475.
4 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1891) 141 U. S. 18, 35
L. Ed. 613, 11 S. C. R. 876, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595.
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state should be allowed to provide for this by levying on said prop-
erty reasonable taxation, i. e., the same rate of taxation as levied
on like property owned by its own residents. A disregard of the
fiction is also necessary at times to prevent large corporations,
whose property consists in large part of franchises, to escape tax-
ation on millions of dollars' worth of property productive of
immense dividends used for the purpose of doing business in
states other than the one in which their main office is situated.
As said by Justice Brewer in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio:- "In
conclusion let us say that this is eminently a practical age; that
courts must recognize things as they are and as possessing a
value which is accorded to them in the markets of the world, and
that no fine-spun theories about situs should interfere to enable
these large corporations, whose business is carried on through
many states, to escape from bearing in each state such burden of
taxation as a fair distribution of the actual value of their property
among those states requires."
Situs of Tangible Personal Property of Common Carriers:
Where the tangible personal property of a common carrier is
employed entirely within a state and not in interstate or foreign
commerce the situs as well as the form of taxing it is a question
for the state. But where it is engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce the question of its situs is then one which must be
determined so as not to conflict with the power of Congress to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce. In this case the states
may tax it only where it has a taxable situs and the form must not
be one which discriminates against it as compared with other
property of the state.
Taxable Situs of Ships: The fact that a steamboat or other
vessel is used in interstate or foreign commerce does not prevent
its being taxed by a state, but its situs for purposes of taxation is
its home port, and what is its home port is determined by its
registry.' The act of Congress7 requires that every vessel shall
be registered at the port nearest to the place where its owner
resides, and the name of this port must be painted on its stem,
in large letters. In the case just cited it was held that vessels
registered at the custom house in New York and engaged in
transporting passengers and freight between San Francisco and
5 (1897) 166 U. S. 185, 41 L. Ed. 965, 17 S. C. R. 604.6 Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., (1854) 17 How. (U. S.) 596, 15 L.
Ed. 254.
7 1 U. S. Stat. at L., p. 287, Sec. 3, R. S. Secs. 4141, 4178.
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Panama had no taxable situs in San Francisco. Nor does the fact
that she is subsequently enrolled in another state as a coaster
affect her situs for purposes of taxation.8 So long as the vessel is
engaged in interstate commerce, the mere physical presence of it
in a state no more fixes its situs there than does the physical pres-
ence of a passenger on an interstate train passing through the
state. While the state having jurisdiction may tax vessels as other
personal property of the state in proportion to their value, it may
not levy a tonnage tax, which is specifically prohibited by the
constitution of the United States and where the vessels are
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, they may not be
required to pay a license tax or any other tax which would be a
regulation of commerce.
Ferry-boats: Where ferry-boats operate between ports of
different states it becomes important to determine which state
has jurisdiction to tax them. This question came before the
Supreme Court of the United States in St. Louis v. The Ferry
Co.10 The ferry company owning the boats was incorporated in
Illinois. The boats operated between East St. Louis, Ill., and St.
Louis, Mo., and when not in use were laid up on the Illinois side
of the river. Under these circumstances the court decided that,
although registered in St. Louis, their home port and hence their
situs for purposes of taxation was in Illinois, not in Missouri,
and that the latter state had no jurisdiction over them for pur-
poses of taxation.
Rolling Stock: But a matter which has caused much more
difficulty and is more important because it affects more property
and more states is the determination of the taxable situs of the
cars and engines of railway companies where such property is
used in interstate commerce and remains in no one state during
the whole year. As the states within which such property was
used during a considerable portion of the year were compelled
to give it protection, they very naturally felt that su h property
was subject to their powers of taxation. Their first attempt at a
solution of the problem was the imposition of a license tax on such
property for the privilege of operating within the state. But in
Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 1 it was held that this was
8 Morgan v. Parham, (1872) 16 Wall. (U. S.) 471, 21 L. Ed. 303.
9 Const., Art. I, Sec. 10 (2). Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, (1876)
94 U. S. 238, 24 L. Ed. 118.
10 (1871) 11 Wall. (U. S.) 423, 20 L. Ed. 192.
11 (1886) 117 U. S. 34, 29 L. Ed. 785, 6 S. C. R. 635.
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an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power of the state, as it
was a direct interference with interstate commerce. The tax in
this case did not purport to be a property tax but a privilege tax
of fifty dollars for each car operated over any railway lines within
the state. In delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Blatch-
ford said: "The car was equally a vehicle of transit, as if it had
been a car owned by the railroad company, and the special con-
veniences or comforts furnished to the passenger had been fur-
nished by the railroad company itself. As such vehicle of transit,
the car, so far as it was engaged in interstate commerce, was not
taxable by the state of Tennessee; because plaintiff had no domi-
cile in Tennessee and was not subject to its jurisdiction for pur-
poses of taxation; and the cars had no situs within the state for
purposes of taxation; and the plaintiff carried on rfo business
within the state, in the sense in which the carrying on of business
in a state is taxable by way of license or privilege."
This sweeping decision made it look discouraging for the
states, but they had not as yet exhausted their ingenuity as to
method of taxing such property or their logic in convincing the
Supreme Court that the property under such circumstances might
have a taxable situs within the state. The state of Pennsylvania
hit upon a theory which, though not entirely logical and accurate,
is, nevertheless, not so illogical and inaccurate as to make it uncon-
stitutional. It levied a tax upon the capital stock of Pullman's
Palace Car Company, an Illinois corporation, some of whose cars
were engaged in the transportation of passengers to and fro
through Pennsylvania. The basis for the assessment on the cap-
ital stock was such proportion of the capital of the company as
the number of miles of railway in Pennsylvania over which the
cars of the company were run bore to the total mileage of track in
that and other states over which its cars were run. This is not
strictly accurate because the number of cars per thousand miles
of road may be considerably greater in one state than in another.
But the rule nevertheless furnishes a fairly practical working
basis. In sustaining the constitutionality of the law, the court
says: "The tax on the capital of the corporation, on account of
its property within the state, is, in substance and effect, a tax on
that property. . . . The cars of this company within the
state of Pennsylvania are employed in interstate commerce; but
their being so employed does not exempt them from taxation by
the state; and the state has not taxed them because of their being
so employed, but because Qf their being within its territory and
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jurisdiction. The cars were continuously and permanently em-
ployed in going to and fro upon certain routes of travel. If they
had never passed beyond the limits of Pennsylvania, it could not
be doubted that the state could tax them, like other-property
within its borders, notwithstanding they were employed in inter-
state commerce. The fact that instead of stopping at the state
boundary, they cross that boundary in going out and coming
back cannot affect the power of the state to levy a tax upon them.
The state, having the right, for the purposes of taxation, to tax
any personal property found within its jurisdiction, without
regard to the place of the owner's domicile, could tax the specific
cars which at a given moment were within its borders.
This was a just and equitable method of assessment; and, if it
were adopted by all the states through which these cars ran, the
company would be assessed upon the whole value of its capital
stock, and no more.'1
2
Undoubtedly a state may tax in proportion to its value the
average amount of the rolling stock of a railway which is. in
habitual use within the state even though some or all of it may
at times pass out of the state and their places be taken by others.
In the case of Marye v. B. & 0. R. Co.,'- the court, discussing a
tax on railway rolling stock, said: "And such a tax might be
properly assessed and collected in cases like the present where the
specific and individual items of property so used and employed
were not continuously the same, but were constantly changing,
according to the exigencies of the business. In such cases the
tax might be fixed by an appraisement and valuation of the aver-
age amount of the property thus habitually used, and collected by
distraint upon any portion that at any time might be found." The
same rule has been applied to refrigerator cars owned by inde-
pendent companies and leased to the railroads.1
4
These numerous decisions of the court of last resort may be
said to have established this as a principle of American law. It
is interesting to note the progress made since the strong dissent-
ing opinion by Justices Bradley, Field, and Harlan in Pullan's
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, cited above, in which we find the
following language: "It seems to me that the real question in
the present case is as to the situs of the cars in question. They
12 Note 4, supra, 141 U. S. at pp. 25, 26.
'3 (1888) 127(U. S. 117, 32 L. Ed. 94, 8 S. C. R. 1037.
14 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, (1900) 177 U. S. 149,
44 L. Ed. 708, 20 S. C. R. 631.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
are used in interstate commerce between Pennsylvania, New
York and the Western States. Their legal situs no more depends
on the states or places where they are carried in the course of their
operations than would that of any steamboats employed by the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company to carry passengers on the Ohio
or Mississippi."15  But the distinction made by the majority of
the court between land and water transportation, as regards the
taxable situs of the instruments used, is, we think, sound legally
and practical economically.
Express Companies: The personal property of an express
company, such as office fixtures, horses, wagons, and cars which
do not go outside of the state present little difficulty, but express
cars and other movable property used in interstate commerce
present the same difficulties as the Pullman and refrigerator cars
and are governed by the same rules. Where an express company
is a purely domestic corporation the taxable situs for its personal
property would be the principal place of business of the corpora-
tion; this would apply to its cars as well as to the rolling stock of
a railway company, but the legislature may vary this."6 With
express companies, the larger question in regard to taxation is
the taxation of its intangible personal property which is usually
several times as large as that of its tangible property, and the
question of its taxable situs will be dealt with later.
Telegraph and Telephone Companies: With reference to
telegraph and telephone companies, there is not s-o much of their
tangible personal property moving from state to state and hence
the question of the taxable situs of such property is not so much
a question of adjusting the taxing powers of the state to the fed-
eral regulation of interstate commerce. It is mainly one of adjust-
ment between the local units of the states. In Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Borough of New Hope'7 the court sustained a license
tax of one dollar per pole and two dollars and a half per mile of
wire on the telegraph, telephone, and electric light poles and wires
within its limits, notwithstanding the fact that this was proven
by the company to be more than the total income from the busi-
ness done by the company in the borough. But with these, as
with express companies, the larger part of their property is usu-
ally intangible. As to their tangible property the difficult ques-
15 Note 4, supra, 141 U. S. at p. 34.16Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 41 L. Ed. 683,
17 S. C. R. 305.
'7 (1903) 187 U. S. 419, 47 L. Ed. 240, 23 S. C. R. 204.
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tions arise in fixing the valuation rather than in determining
their situs.
Timber: While growing timber is a part of the realty and
the question of its situs presents no difficulty, being that of the
land on which it grows, when severed it becomes personal prop-
erty and like other personal property can acquire a situs of its
own. Logs or lumber, unless actually in transit in interstate com-
merce, would be subject to taxation wherever it might be when the
assessment roll is completed. If in transit it would not have a
situs of its own and would be taxed at the domicile of the owner,
unless before shipment it had acquired a situs different from that
of the domicile of the owner.'18
Coal: Until mined, coal is a part of the realty and is taxed as
such, but as soon as it is mined it becomes personalty and would
be taxable where taken to the surface through the main workings,
unless as a result of transportation it has acquired a situs at
another place. The same principles determine the taxable situs
of ore.1 9 As to when coal shipped from one state into another
ceases to be in transit and acquires a taxable situs, the case of
Brozwn v. Houston20 is interesting. It was held in this case that a
cargo of coal shipped from Pittsburgh, Pa., and offered for sale in
New Orleans had a taxable situs there even though it might later
be exported to another state, as claimed by the plaintiffs would be
done.
Live Stock: This is a form of tangible personal property
which may readily acquire a situs of its own and does if perma-
nently located in a taxing district other than that of the owner's
domicile. Though live stock does not acquire a situs of its own
during continuous transit in interstate commerce, it does when
unloaded at stockyards and offered for sale there ;21 or if shipped
under a bill of lading which allows of the animals being fed for
an indefinite time at an intermediate point and then shipped to
a point in another state without a new bill of lading, they acquire
a taxable situs at their feeding station.2 In the Maryland case
the court stated with clearness the principle on which the cattle
18 Osterhout v. Jones, (1884) 54 Mich. 228, 19 N. W. 964. As to
when lumber is constructively in transit, see Corning v. "Masonville Twp.,
(1889) 74 Mich. 177, 41 N. W. 831.
19 Eureka Hill Mining Co. v. Eureka, (1900) 22 Utah 447, 63 Pac. 654.
20 (1885) 114 U. S. 622, 29 1- Ed. 257, 55 S. C. R. 1091.
21 Myers v. Baltimore County, (1896) 83 Md. 385, 35 Atl. 144, 34
L. R. A. 309, 55 Am. St. Rep. 349.
22 Waggoner v. Whaley, (1899) 21 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 50 S. W. 153.
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are held to have acquired a taxable situs in Baltimore County:
"In this case the place of destination, upon their shipment from
the west, is Baltimore County; and in the latter place the owners
keep them until they shall have determined what disposition shall
be made of them. The property, then, ndt being in transit, either
through the state or from a point in the state to a point outside, is
property within the state within the meaning of the statute."23
"It then quotes with approval from Carrier v. Gordon:21 "The
safer rule is to consider property actually in transit as belonging
to the place of its destination, and property not in transit as prop-
erty in the place of its situs, without regard to the intention of
the owner, or his residence in or out of the state." Clearly the
intention to ship at a future time cannot determine the situs, as
that would make the taxation of most movable property depend
upon the mere intention of the owner, a fact too difficult of ascer-
tainment to furnish a workable basis for deciding whether or not
the state may collect revenue for its support.
In the Texas case the cattle were shipped to Chicago, Kansas
City, etc., from Oklahoma, but were held for feeding at the
defendant's cotton-seed mill in Montague County, Texas. We
quote from the opinion -of the court: "We are not inclined to
hold that cattle in Texas while being fattened in the owners' pens
for the outside markets are too transient to have a situs and to be
taxable here. Indeed, feeding cattle for such markets has become,
as grazing cattle has long been, a permanent as well as extensive
and profitable pursuit of the Texas people. It is a local industry,
and during the feeding season the cattle, from whatever source
they may come, become an important part of the mass of the
personal property of the state, enjoying alike the protection of
our laws and subject to the common burden of taxation. Still
less are we inclined to hold that cattle so situated are exempt from
local taxation in consequence of the commerce clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution. If it should be so held, then to what movable
property in the states may not this ever-expanding clause be
extended? The paper cloak of an adjustable through bill of lad-
ing, like those found in this record, may thus be easily made broad
enough to cover from local taxation all the cattle of Texas,
whether grazing in pastures, or on the open range, or feeding in
pens. To the feeding in transit privilege, need only be added
23 Note 21, supra.
24 (1871) 21 Ohio St. 605.
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the grazing in transit privilege, and all will be covered. If the
owner may be allowed ninety days for feeding, why may he not
be allowed six months or a year or two for grazing? In both
cases the cattle may be said, figuratively speaking, to be on their
way to Chicago or other market, but not in the sense of interstate
commerce or tax laws."2 5
In Nolan v. San Antonio Ranch Co.,2 it was held that where
a herd of cattle pastures in more than one county the percentage
of the herd taxed by each county shall be the same as the percent-
age which the pasture in that county is of the whole pasture, and
that the location of the general management of them was imma-
terial. This is, of course, a proper matter for control by the state
legislature, and the statute providing for the above distribution
among the subordinate taxing units would be clearly constitu-
tional. Where a farm is partly in one township or county and
partly in another, other factors than the extent of land in each
may determine the taxable situs of stock kept thereon. For
instance, where the barn is in one taxing district and the house in
another, and the live stock is kept or fed in the barn during part
or all of the year, the subdivision in which the barn rather than
the one in which the house is located would be the taxable situs
of the stock kept on such farm.
27
Dogs: There is conflict of authority as to whether or not dogs
are property at all. If property, they are, of course, personal
property and if taxed for purposes of revenue the same rule as
to situs would hold in regard to them as in regard to other domes-
tic animals. In Mullaly v. People,28 the court, after examining
the old rules under which dogs were considered ferae naturae,
said: "The artificial reasoning upon which these rules were based
is wholly inapplicable to modern society. Tempora mutantur et
leges mutantur in illis. Large amounts of money are now invest-
ed in dogs, and they are largely the subjects of trade and traffic.
In many ways they are put to useful service, and so far as per-
tains to their ownership as personal property, they possess all the
attributes of other personal property." It was held in this case
that they came under the statutory designation of personal prop-
erty. Even though not looked upon as property, they may still
be taxed for regulative purposes. It is then in the nature of a
25 Note 22, supra.
20 (1891) 81 Tex. 315, 16 S. W. 1064.
27 Pierce v. Eddy, (1891) 152 Mass. 594, 26 N. E. 99.
28 (1881) 86 N. Y. 365.
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license or privilege tax and the situs would naturally be that of the
owner's domicile.
INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
Public Stocks and Bonds: We will not discuss here the right
of the state to tax evidences of public indebtedness, but will con-
fine ourselves to the question of their situs when taxable at all.
That the taxable situs of such property is the domicile of the owner
may be regarded as fairly well settled in this country since the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds,29 cited with approval in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania.0 Thus a resident of Nebras-
ka could not be taxed in Illinois on bonds of the city of Chicago
held by him.
Shares of Stock in Private Corporations: Contrary to the
rule as to public stock, private corporation stock may be taxed in
the state of the incorporation regardless of the residence of the
owner of such stock, as this class of stock has a taxable situs at
the domicile of the corporation. In Tappan v. Merchants' Bank,31
the court, speaking through Chief Justice Waite, said: "Shares
of stock in national banks are personal property. They are made
so in express terms by the act of Congress under which such
banks are organized. They are a species of personal property
which is in one sense intangible and incorporeal, but the law
which creates them may separate them from the person of their
owner for the purposes of taxation, and give them a situs of their
own. This has been done. . . . The shareholder is protected
in his person by the government at the place where he resides;
but his property in this stock is protected at the place where the
bank transacts his business. He requires for it the protection of
the government there, and it seems reasonable that he should be
compelled to contribute there to the expenses of maintaining that
government. It certainly cannot be an abuse of legislative dis-
cretion to require him to do so."
In corporations over which the states have control, their legis-
latures may fix the situs of their stock for purposes of taxation,
as Congress has done in the case of the stock in national banks.
32
29 (1872) 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300, 21 L. Ed. 179. [Cleveland, etc., R.
Co. v. Pennsylvania.]
30 (1894) 153 U. S. 628, 38 L. Ed. 854, 14 S. C. R. 952.
31 Note 2, supra.32 St. Albans v. National Car Co., (1884) 57 Vt. 68.
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The fact that the stock is taxed at the domicile of the corporation
does not, however, prevent the state in which the stockholder
resides from taxing it there as a part of his personal property.33
Whether or not the legislature will exercise this power is a ques-
tion of expediency, not one of legal right. As said by the supreme
court of Ohio in Bradley v. Bander:34 "The constitutional power
to tax shares of stock, owned by our citizens in corporations locat-
ed without the state, does not depend on whether or not the capital
of the corporation is or is not taxed in the state where the corpora-
tion is created. The power is the same, whether the capital of the
corporation is taxed there or not." The Ohio statute taxing resi-
dents on shares of stock in non-resident as well as in domestic
corporations was held constitutional by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Sturges v. Carter.3 5 This may safely be
regarded as an established principle.
Corporate Franchises: There is pretty general agreement in
this country that corporate franchises are personal property and
not mere naked powers, but rather powers coupled with an inter-
est which vest in the corporation by virtue of its charter.36 What-
ever may be the form of the balance of its property, the franchises
of a corporation are personalty.37  There is also general agree-
ment that they are taxable just as much as any other property,
unless specifically exempted.3" Nor is it necessary that they be
mentioned eo nomine, but are taxable under a statute requiring
all property in the state, not exempt, to be taxed. 39 Of course,
the states may not without the consent of Congress tax the fran-
chises granted by the federal government; hence the franchise of
a national bank is not taxable by a state. The taxable situs of this
species of personalty (the franchises of a corporation) is the
domicile of the corporation, i. e., where its principal office is locat-
ed.40 The question of situs does not occasion as much difficulty
as does the question of valuation.
33Bacon v. Board of State Tax Commissioners, (1901) 126 Mich.
22, 85 N. W. 307, 60 L, R. A. 321, 86 Am. St. Rep. 524.
34 (1880) 36 Ohio St. 28, 38 Am. Rep. -547.
35 (1885) 114 U. S. 511, 29 L. Ed. 240, 5 S. C. R. 1014.
36 Society for Savings v. Coite, (1867) 6 Wall. (U. S.) 594, 18 L. Ed.
897. 3 7 Monroe County Sav. Bank v. Rochester, (1867) 37 N. Y. 365.
38 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. New Orleans, (1892) 143 U. S. 192, 36
L. Ed. 121, 12 S. C. R. 406.3 9 Fond du Lac Water Co. v. Fond du Lac, (1892) 82 Wis. 322, 52
N. W. 439, 16 L, R. A. 581.
40 See Minn. G. S. 1913, Sec. 1999. As to what is a franchise tax,
see Cooley, Taxation, I, 3rd ed., 676 et seq.
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The certificate of a corporation is not necessarily final as to
the domicile of a corporation. In Wisconsin the location desig-
nated in its articles of incorporation is not conclusive as to its
principal office or place of business so as to enable it to escape the
fair burdens of taxation, but the state may inquire whether or
not the designation in its charter conforms to the facts.41  In
Michigan, also, the place where its actual business is transacted
and not the place named in the charter, where the two do not
corrrespond, is considered the situs for purposes of taxation.42
The purpose of this is clearly to prevent. a corporation from dodg-
ing its fair share of taxation by naming a small town, where
the tax rate is low, as its principal place of business, notwithstand-
ing the fact that its actual business is done in a large city where
the rate is much higher.
However just and practical this view may seem, it is not the
one held by the New York courts. In Western Transp. Co. v.
Scheu43 it was held that the principal office of a domestic corpora-
tion was conclusively fixed by its articles of incorporation, that
this was as true for purposes of taxation as for other purposes,
and that only in that place could it be lawfully taxed on its per-
sonal property. And in a later case 44 it was held that the place
designated by the articles of incorporation was no less conclusive,
even though it appeared that it was deliberately chosen to avoid
taxation in the place where the actual operations were intended
to be conducted. In this case the place named in the articles was
Clarkstown, a little inland village in Rockland County, which
could not possibly be the principal place of business of this cor-
poration. But this did not trouble the court, which disposes of the
matter in the following cavalier way: "If the company had a
principal office so located by its certificate, then it was to be taxed
where its financial concerns were transacted. It is urged that the
purpose for which the principal office of the plaintiff was located
in the county of Rockland was to avoid taxation. That may be.
We held that to be immaterial in the case of the Western
Transportation Company. We have nothing to do with the
motive. We deal only with the fact." But it would seem to
4' Milwaukee S. S. Co. v. Milwaukee, (1892) 83 Wis. 590, 53 N. W.
839, 18 L. R. A. 353.42 Detroit Transp. Co. v. Board of Assessors, (1892) 91 Mich. 382,
51 N. W. 978.
4:3 (1859) 19 N. Y. 408.
44Union Steamboat Co. v. Buffalo, (f880) 82 N. Y. 351.
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one possessed of average common sense that they dealt only with
the fiction and not with the fact. The fact was-and this is undis-
puted-that their principal place of business was in Buffalo,
regardless of where they said it was.
In the case of corporations not under the control of the federal
government, either by virtue of their creation or the character of
their business, it is competent for the legislature of the state to
make of a foreign corporation doing business within it a domestic
corporation for purposes of taxation. In Young v. South
Tredegar Iron Co., 5 Judge Lurton, later of the Supreme Court of
the United States, says: "It is not, in our judgment, optional
with such corporations as to whither they will or will not become
domestic corporations as required by this act. Sound reasons of
public policy, in view of the rapid increase of the number of cor-
porations, and the vast amount of wealth engaged in corporate
business, demanded legislative regulation as to the terms upon
which corporations of other states should be suffered to carry on
business within this state. The legislation by which the corpora-
tions of other states are made corporations of this state is clearly
within the legislative power." Where the only franchise granted
to a foreign corporation is not the right to exist, i. e., the right to
become a domestic corporation, but is merely the right to do
business, the form of taxing this franchise is a license tax and
the situs of the property for the purposes of levying this tax is
the principal place of business of such foreign corporation within
the state. Foreign insurance companies may be so taxed. 6
Tax on Gross Receipts: Closely related to a franchise tax on
a corporation is a tax on its gross or net receipts. It is more com-
monly levied on gross receipts so as to prevent the corporation
from reducing the taxable fund by unnecessary expenses. Though
a state may tax a corporation engaged in interstate commerce on
receipts derived from local business, it may not tax it on receipts
derived from interstate commerce. Although this statement con-
flicts with the decision in the case of the State Tax on Railway
Gross Receipts, 47 it is undoubtedly in accord with the weight of
authority in this country. 8 It will be noted that the cases cited
45 (1886) 85 Tenn. 189, 2 S. W. 202, 4 Am. St. Rep. 752.46 Ducat v. Chicago, (1870) 10 Wall. (U. S.) 410. 19 L. Ed. 972.
47 (1872) 15 Wall. (U. S.) 284, 21 L. Ed. 164. [Philadelphia & Read-
ing R. Co. v. Pennsylvania.]
48Fargo v. Michigan, (1887) 121 U. S. 230, 30 L Ed. 888, 7 S. C. R.
857; Philadelphia, etc., S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1887) 122 U. S. 326,
30 L. Ed. 1200, 7 S. C. R. 1118; Ratterman v., Western Union Tel. Co.,
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include steamship, express, telegraph, and railway companies, and
substantially overrule the decision in the State Tax on Railway
Gross Receipts. In fact, the court says in Steamship Co. v.
Pennsylvania: "A review of the question convinces us that the
first ground on which the decision in State Tax on Railway Gross
Receipts was placed is not tenable; that it is not supported by
anything decided in Brown v. Maryland; but, on the contrary, that
the reasoning in that case is decidedly against it. The second
ground on which the decision referred to was based was, that
the tax was upon the franchise of the corporation granted to it by
the state. If intended as a tax on the franchise of doing busi-
ness,-which in this case is the business of transportation in car-
rying on interstate and foreign commerce-it would clearly be
unconstitutional."4 9  Where the state has jurisdiction to levy a
franchise tax, and it undoubtedly has in the case of corporations
created by it, the gross receipts may be taken as a measure for
determining the value of the franchise. The situs for taxing
gross receipts would be the principal place of business of the
corporation, as in the case of franchises already discussed.
Good Will: The taxation of the good will of the business of
a private individual or partnership corresponds to the taxation of
the franchise of a corporation. Though it has been held by the
courts of New York and Indiana that good will is neither real
nor personal property,50 it has market value and is the subject of
purchase and sale as other personal property and has been decided
(1888) 127 U. S. 411, 32 L. Ed. 229, 8 S. C. R. 1127; Pacific Express Co.
v. Seibert, (1892) 142 U. S. 339, 35 L Ed. 1035, 12 S. C. R. 250; New
York, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1895) 158 U. S. 431, 39 L. Ed. 1043,
15 S. C. R. 896; McHenry v. Alford, (1898) 168 U. S. 651, 42 L. Ed. 614,
18 S. C. R. 242. These cases are not to be confounded with such cases as
United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, (1912) 223 U. S. 335, 56 L. Ed.
459, 32 S. C. R. 211, aff'g 114 Minn. 346, 131 N. W. 489; Maine v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., (1891) 142 U. S. 217, 35 L. Ed. 994, 12 S. C. R. 121,
holding that a state tax upon the property within the state of a foreign
corporation engaged in interstate commerce is not invalid though the
value of the property is calculated upon the amount of its gross receipts.
In the latter case the tax was called a franchise tax. It was held not to
lie a tax upon gross receipts. See, also, Western Union Co. v. Taggart,
(1896) 163 U. S. 1, 41 L Ed. 49, 16 S. C. R. 1054; Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio State Auditor, (1897) 165 U. S. 194, 41 L. Ed. 683, 17 S. C. R. 305;
Galveston, etc., Co. v. Texas, (1908) 210 U. S. 217, 52 L. Ed. 1031, 28
S. C. R. 638.
49 Note 48, supra, 122 U. S. at p. 342.
50 People v. Dederick, (1900) 161 N. Y. 195, 55 N. E. 927; Hart v.
Smith, (1902) 159 Ind. 182, 64 N. E. 661, 58 L. R. A. 949, 95 Am. St. Rep.
280.
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to be such by the courts of England and the United States.51 In
a note to the latter case cited the authorities on the subject are
given. The situs is the place where the business is carried on.
Debts: Debts, whether due from an individual, a private cor-
poration, a state, or one of its subdivisions, unless exempted by
statute, constitute a form of personal property which is subject
to taxation and its situs is the domicile of the one to whom such
debt is owed. 52 In the case cited the debt was to be paid to a
resident of Connecticut and- it was contended that this tax was
unconstitutional because it was a regulation of interstate com-
merce, abridged the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States," taxed property situated outside the state, violated
the sovereignty of Illinois over property within her borders, im-
paired the obligation of contracts, deprived plaintiff of his prop-
erty without due process of law.
In disposing of these objections, Justice Harlan, speaking for
the court, said: "Plainly, our only duty is to enquire whether the
Constitution prohibits a state from taxing in the hands of one of
its resident citizens a debt held by him upon a resident of another
state, and evidenced by the bond -of the debtor, secured by deed
of trust or mortgage upon real estate situated in the state in which
the debtor resides. The question does not seem to us to be very
difficult of solution. The creditor, it is conceded, is a permanent
resident within the jurisdiction of the state imposing the tax.
The debt is property in his hands constituting a portion of his
wealth, from which he is under the highest obligation, in common
with his fellow-citizens of the same state, to contribute for the
support of the government whose protection he enjoys. That
debt, although a species of intangible property, may, for purposes
of taxation, if not for all others, be regarded as situated at the
domicile of the creditor. It is none the less property because its
amount and maturity are set forth in a bond. That bond where-
ever actually held or deposited is only evidence of the debt, and
if destroyed, the debt-the right to demand payment of the money
loaned, with the stipulated interest-remains. Nor is the debt,
for purposes of taxation, affected by the fact that it is secured by
a mortgage on real estate situated in Illinois. It may undoubtedly
be taxed by the state when held by a resident therein."
Nor is the taxing power of the state in which the creditor is
51 Crawshay v. Collins, (1808) 15 Ves. Jr. 218, 1 J. & W. 267, 2 Russ.
325; Barber v. Insurance Co., (1883) 15 Fed. 312.52 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, (1879) 100 U. S. 491, 25 L Ed. 558.
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located affected by the fact that the same property is taxed in
another state. Whether the former state shall on this account
exempt such property from taxation by it is a question of expe-
diency which it alone must determine, as there is no federal
question involved. For, as said by the court in-the case just
cited, this "is a matter which concerns only the people of that
state, with which the federal government cannot rightly interfere."
Neither does the fact that the debt is one against another state
affect its situs, or the right of the state in which the creditor
resides to tax the property.53 Where there is but one state
involved and it is a question between different taxing units within
it as to the taxable situs of bonds, notes, credits, and choses in
action in general, the matter is regulated by statute, but in the
absence of statutes, the domicile of the owner, not that of the
agent, governs, although there is conflict of authority on this
point. 5 4 In the case cited, which was one involving the situs of
promissory notes, the court says: "The thing taxed is the debt,
a species of'intangible property incapable of an actual situs inde-
pendent of the owner." The opposite view is taken in People ex
rel. Jefferson v. Smith.5"
That the domicile of the creditor rather than that of the debtor
should be the situs for taxing debts seems clear. For as said by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Railroad Co. v.
Pennsvlvania:8 "Debts owing by corporations, like debts owing
by individuals, are not property of the debtors in any sense; they
are obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the hands
of the creditors. With them they are property and in their hands
they may be taxed. To call debts the property of debtors is
simply to misuse terms." In accord with this line of reasoning
the supreme court of Montana in construing a statute requiring
property to be taxed in the county "where the same may be
found," held that a mortgage is not taxable in the county where
it is recorded, unless the mortgage itself is owned tiere.57
The argument in favor of taxing mortgages and choses in
action, which are required to be recorded in order to maintain
priority as a lien, at the situs where they are recorded is an admin-
istrative rather than a logical one. Undoubtedly fewer such in-
5 Bonaparte v. Tax Court, (1881) 104 U. S. 592, 26 L. Ed. 845.
54Boyd v. Selma, (1891) 96 Ala. 144, 11 So. 393.
55 (1882) 88 N. Y. 576.
56 Note 30, supra.
57 Galltin County v. Beattie, (1878) 3 Mont. 173.
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struments would escape taxation under this method than under the
one providing for their taxation at the domicile of the creditor.
If, however, the place of record is made the situs for purposes of
taxation, as may be provided by the legislature, and the tax is
collected from the mortgagor, provision should be made allowing
him to deduct this from the amount due' on the mortgage.
Bank Deposits: Money deposited in bank, unless it is a spe-
cial deposit which calls for the return of the identical pieces of
money deposited and makes the bank a mere bailee, is not tangible
property for purposes of taxation, but for this as for commercial
purposes is a mere credit and the relation between the depositor
and the bank is that of debtor and creditor rather than that of
bailor and bailee. 5s Being a debt, their situs for purposes of tax-
ation follows the rule -of mobilia sequuntur personam and hence
is at the domicile of the creditor. In Pyle v. Brenneman, just cited,
the Circuit Court of Appeals says: "A deposit in bank to the
credit of a depositor, and subject to his check, is not a bailment.
It is a loan. The depositor does not retain a property in any par-
ticular funds, but the money which he deposits goes into the
funds of the bank. The bank owes him the amount, and the rela-
tion of debtor and creditor is created by the transaction.
This is the law as it is declared by both the federal and the state
courts in this country, and in obedience to it we hold that the
deposits of Brenneman in the banks of Sistersville are debts due
him by -the banks, and that the situs of the property is the domicile
of the creditor." In this case, diversity of citizenship gave the
federal courts jurisdiction.
But this rule makes it possible for most depositors to escape
taxation on their deposits in banks. Where but one state is
involved, if the legislature would make the location of the bank
5s San Francisco v. Lux, (1884) 64 Cal. 481, 2 Pac. 254; Pyle v. Bren-
neman, (1903) 60 C. C. A. 409, 122 Fed. 787. Clason v. New Orleans,
(1894) 46 La. Ann. 1, 14 So. 306; Pendleton v. Commonwealth, (1909)
110 Va. 229, 65 S. E. 536.
In Fidelity, etc., Trust Co. v. Louisville, (1917) 245 U. S. 54, 62 L.
Ed. 145, 38 S. C. R. 40, a taxpayer domiciled in Kentucky carried on
business in Missouri, depositing his gains therefrom in banks in Missouri.
After his death, a claim was made upon his estate by the city of his
domicile to recover omitted taxes in respect of those deposits. It was
held by the Supreme Court of the United States that, conceding without
argument that the deposits could have been taxed by Missouri, under the
authority of Liverpool, L., & G. Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, (1911) 221
U. S. 346, 55 L. Ed. 762, 31 S. C. R. 550, L. R. A. 1915C 903, and Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, (1907) 205 U. S. 395, 51 L. Ed.
853, 27 S. C. R. 499, the deposits were also taxable in Kentucky, and that
such double taxation is not subject to any constitutional objection.
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the situs and where more than one state is concerned an inter-
state agreement to that effect were made, this would establish a
rule under which it would be very difficult for bank deposits to
escape taxation. The daily, weekly, or monthly averages could
be taken as the basis for valuation. Even in the absence of spe-
cific legislation on the point, there are cases which hold that the
location of the bank is the proper situs.59
Annuities: Though an annuity, if given with words of inher-
itance, will for purposes of descent be treated as real estate, for
purposes of taxation it is treated as personal property. Its situs
is that of the domicile of the annuitant, and for the same reason
that the taxable situs of a debt is the domicile of the creditor. An
annuitant can be assessed only on the amount due and unpaid at
the date of assessment and not on the principal sum producing
the annuity.60
Seats in Stock E.xchange: A seat, which is equivalent to
membership, in a stock or produce exchange, although intangible,
is a right which has marketable value, can be bought and sold,
and is a species of personal property. Yet it was held in Thomp-
son v. Adams6 that "the seat is not property in the eye of the
law, . . . It is the mere creation of the board, and, of course,
was to be held and enjoyed with all the limitations and restrictions
which the constitution of the board chooses to put upon it."
But the Supreme Court of the United States in Page v. Edmunds
6 2
says: "Undoubtedly the seat in the board 'was to be held and
enjoyed with all the limitations and restrictions which the board
choses to put upon it.' We expressed that limitation in Hyde v.
Woods, 94 U. S. 525, but we decided nevertheless that a seat was
property."
As a valuable form of personal property there is no reason
why it cannot or should not be taxed by the state legislature;
although it was held in People v. Feitner6 ' that a seat was not
taxable under the general statute taxing personal property; a like
decision was rendered by the Maryland supreme court in Balti-
more v. Johnson,6 and the supreme court of California in San
59 New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, (1908) 121
La. 1068, 47 So. 27, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1120.
60 State v. Cornell, (1865) 31 N. J. *L. 374.
61 (1880) 93 Pa. St. 55.
62 (1903) 187 U. S. 596, 47 L. Ed. 318, 23 S. C. R. 200.
63 (1901) 167 N. Y. 1, 60 N. E. 265. 82 Am. St. Rep. 698.
64 (1903) 96 Md. 737, 54 Atl. 646, 61 L. R. A. 568.
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Francisco v. Anderso, 615 that a seat "has no such qualities as make
it assessable and taxable as property. It is a mere right to belong
to a certain association with the latter's consent, and to enjoy
certain personal privileges and advantages which flow from mem-
bership of such association. . . . It is too impalpable to go
into any category of taxable property." But this reasoning, or
rather dogmatic form of assertion, is not convincing and does
not square with present-day standards of justice in the distribu-
tion of the burdens of taxation. In Minnesota, it is settled that
membership in a board of trade is property, and taxable."8 As
the right can be exercised only at the place where the exchange is
located and there receives its protection, that is naturally its situs
for purposes of taxation.
Copyrights and Patent Rights: While the states may not tax
the incorporeal right of an author or inventor to his idea or
invention or discovery, which right is conferred by the federal
government, 7 they may tax the tangible articles in which the
ideas, invention, or discovery are embodied. Thus it was held in
Weber v. Virginia,6  that letters patent granted by the United
States did not exempt from the tax or license laws of Virginia
the tangible articles produced in accordance with the rights con-
ferred by these letters patent. As said by the court: "It is only
the right to the invention or discovery-the incorporeal right-
which the state cannot interfere with. Whatever rights are
secured to inventors must be enjoyed in subordination to the
general authority of the state over all property within its limits."
It then quotes with approval the language of Justice Harlan in.
Patterson v. Kentucky: 9 "The right of property in the physical
05 (1894) 103 Cal. 69, 36 Pac. 1034, 42 Am. St. Rep. 98.
66 State v. McPhail, (1914) 124 Minn. 398, 145 N. W. 108.
67 People ex rel. Edison Elec. Illum. Co. v. Assessors, (1898) 156
N. Y. 417, 51 N. E. 269, 42 L. R. A. 290; Commonwealth v. Westinghouse,
etc., Co., (1892) 151 Pa. St. 265, 24 Atl. 1107; Commonwealth v. Phila.
Co., (1893) 157 Pa. St. 527, 27 Atl. 378; People ex rel. A. T. Johnson Co.
v. Roberts, (1899) 159 N. Y. 70, 53 N. E. 685, 45 L. R. A. 126 (copy-
right). It seems to be established that when the tax is not upon the prop-
erty of the corporation, but is in the nature of a privilege tax, the fact
that a part of the capital is invested in patents or copyrights is not a
reason for exemption. State ex rel. Marsden Co. v. State Board, (1898)
61 N. J. L. 461, 39 Atl. 638. That practically the whole capital of a cor-
poration is represented by patent rights which are not subject to taxation
does not prevent the assessment against it of a franchise tax regulated by
the amount of the capital which is employed within the state. People ex
rel. U. S. Aluminum Printing Plate Co. v. Knight, (1903) 174 N. Y. 475.
67 N. E. 65, 63 L. R. A. 87.
68 (1880) 103 U. S. 344, 26 L. Ed. 565.
69 (1878) 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. Ed. 1115.
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substance of the discovery is altogether distinct from the right
in the discovery itself, just as the property in the instruments or
plates by which copies of a map are multiplied is distinct from
the copyright of the map itself." The taxable situs of the tangible
property is the same as that of other tangible property already
discussed.
'The Right to Bequeath and Inherit Property: The right or
privilege to bequeath property is not generally looked upon as
a natural right inherent in one by reason of his membership in
human society, but is rather an artificial, conventional right or
privilege conferred upon one by the state to say who shall enjoy
the use of his property after his death. The same is true of the
right or privilege of taking property by will or inheritance. As
the state confers this right, it may say under what conditions or
restrictions and subject to what burdens it shall be exercised.
Hence the right of the state to levy inheritance or succession taxes.
This is not a tax on property but upon its transmission. Hence
the states may tax a bequest of property to the United States, not-
withstanding the fact that it cannot tax the property of the
United States.70
After deciding that "the tax is not a tax. upon the property
itself, but upon its transmission by will or by descent," the court
quotes with approval the language -of Chief Justice Taney in
Mager v. Grima: 1 "The law in question is nothing more than the
exercise of the power which every state and sovereignty possesses
of regulating the manner and terms within which property, real
and personal, within its dominion may be transferred by last
will and testament, or by inheritance; and of prescribing who
shall and who shall not be capable of taking it. . . . If a state
may deny the privilege altogether, it follows that when it grants
it, it may annex to the grant any conditions which it supposes to
be required by its interests or policy." The situs for the taxation
of this incorporeal right of transmitting and receiving property
is the domicile of the decedent and, unless otherwise provided by
statute or agreement, the place where the property transmitted
is located. Thus New York may levy an inheritance tax on money
deposited in its banks, even though Pennsylvania, in which the
70 United States v. Perkins, (1896) 163 U. S. 625, 41 L. Ed. 287, 16
S. C. R. 1073; Plummer v. Coler, (1900) 178 U. S. 115, 44 L. Ed. 998, 20
S. C. R. 829.
71 (1850) 8 How. (U. S.) 490, 12 L. Ed. 1168.
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decedent was domiciled, has levied a like tax on the right to
bequeath the money."2
SITUS OF TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE PROPERTY IN CASE OF
QUALIFIED OWNERSHIP
Trust Property: In general, the taxable situs of trust property
is the residence of the trustee. This is the rule laid down in
Smith v. Byers.73 And in People v. Albany Assessors
74 it was
held that the trustee was liable for the taxes on trust property
even though the property was located in a foreign jurisdiction.
And in Dorr v. Boston75 it was held that shares of stock in a cor-
poration held by non-resident trustees are not taxable to resident
beneficiaries. But, as in the case of personal property held
directly by the owner, it is competent for the legislature to fix
the situs of trust property, when such property consists of per-
sonalty, but not, of course, unless it has jurisdiction over the
trustee or property. Thus it was held by the Rhode Island court
that a statutd providing that personal property held in trust should
be taxed at the residence of the beneficiary was inoperative where
both the trustee and property were outside the state.7
6  Where
there are several trustees and they do not all reside in the same
jurisdiction, the weight of authority is that they are taxed pro
rata as to the personal property held in trust, as neither juris-
diction can tax the trustee residing outside of it.
7 7 The fact that
a majority of the trustees reside within the jurisdiction would not
give it authority to tax the whole fund.
Decedents' Estates: The personal iroperty of a decedent has
its situs for purposes of taxation at the domicile of the executor
or administrator.-, But there is some conflict on this point. The
Missouri court holds that the taxable situs of the personal prop-
erty of a decedent is his last place of residence rather than the
residence of his personal representative.-
9  A like decision was
reached by the Connecticut court in the case of Cornwall v.
72 In re Burr's Estate, (1895) 38 N. Y. Supp. 811, 16 Misc. Rep. 89,
74 N. Y. St. Rep. 490. For a full discussion of Jurisdiction for Inherit-
ance Taxation, see article, W. J. Stevenson, 1 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
314.
73 (1871) 43 Ga. 191. So declared in State v. Willard, (1899) 77
Minn. 190, 79 N. W. 829.
7.1 (1869) 40 N. Y. 160.
75 (1856) 6 Gray (Mass.) 131.
76 Anthony v. Caswell, (1885) 15 R. I. 159, 1 Atl. 290.
77 Trustees v. City Council of Augusta, (1892) 90 Ga. 634, 17 S E. 61.
78 State v. Corson, (1888) 50 N. J. L. 381. 13 Atl. 265.
79 Stephens v. Boone~ille, (1864) 34 Mo. 323.
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Todd. 0 The New Jersey holding would seem to be the more
logical, as for purposes of taxation the personal representative is
looked upon as owner; he is constructively in possession; and
where listing is required, as is usually the case with personal
property, he is the one legally required to do the listing. This
view accords with the weight of authority. In Minnesota, by
statute, the personal property of the estate -of a deceased person
is listed and assessed at the place of listing at the time of his
death.8 '
Infant's Property: Although not entirely free from conflict,
it is a general rule that the situs for purposes of taxation of the
personal property of an infant in the custody of a guardian is the
residence of the guardian rather than that of the infant.8 2 But
where the infant acquires a separate domicile with the consent of
the guardian, it was held, in Kirkland v. Whate, 8 3 that the tax-
able situs of his personal estate becomes that of the infant. In
the case of the death of an infant, still having a guardian, the
situs of his personal property for purposes of taxation shifts from
the guardian's domicile to that of the administrator.8 4
DOUBLE TAXATION
In General: In devising a system of taxation there are two
main considerations which must never be lost sight of-adequacy
of revenue and justice in the distribution of the burden. A failure
to meet the first requisite will cripple the activities of the state,
and a disregard of the second will cause dissatisfaction and
demoralization. Double or duplicate taxation does not accord
with our sense of justice in the distribution of the burden, in that
the property -of some is compelled in this way to bear more of the
burden than an equal amount of the same class of property owned
by others. The injustice of this readily appears when we reflect
that if all the property were owned by the state no one would
contend for a rule which would require some of the tenants to pay
rent twice while others were assessed but once -on the same kind
of property. In the case of real property, double taxation is not
resorted to where the whole interest is held by the same person.
But in the case of personal property, double taxation is not uncom-
80 (1871) 38 Conn. 443.81 Minn. G. S. 1913, Sec. 2008.8 2 Tousey v. Bell, (1864) 23 Ind. 433; Minn. G. S. 1913, Sec. 2009.
83 (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 462.
84 Sommers v. Boyd, (1891) 48 Ohio St. 648, 29 N. E. 497.
SITUS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY FOR TAXATION 2 1
mon, and however unfair it may be, it is not, apart from a consti-
tutional prohibition, illegal. We are here concerned with double
taxation of personal property only, and with reference to this
species of property only in so far as double taxation results from
double situs. This may happen where the property has a taxable
situs in more than one subdivision of the same state or where it
has a taxable situs in more than one state.
Where More than One Situs in Same State: As already sug-
gested, double taxation in the same state may be prevented by
a provision in the constitution prohibiting it. In many cases where
there is no constitutional provision the statutes provide that a
receipt for taxes paid on person or property in one part of the state
shall be good throughout the state against demands for taxes
on the same person or property for that year. A failure on the
part of the legislature seems inexcusable. And this is equally
true whether the question of double situs results from a moving
about of the property or from the fact that the owner is domiciled
in one part of the state and the personal property located in
another part. Where the statute has not dealt with the question
of the situs of personal property located in one district and the
owner domiciled in another, the courts usually hold that the dom-
icile of the owner is the situs for purposes of taxation. This is
particularly so of intangible personal property.8 5 Where it is a
dispute between different districts of the same state, there is no
federal question involved so as to bring it into the United States
courts. Double taxation within a state does not violate the pro-
vision of the federal constitution in the Fifth Amendment requir-
ing due process of law, or the Fourteenth Amendment. In dis-
cussing this question the Supreme Court of the United States
says, in Davidson v. New Orleans:6 "Whenever by the laws of a
state, or by state authority, a tax, assessment, servitude, or other
burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it
be for the whole state or of some more limited portion of the
community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or
contesting the charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts of
justice, with such notice to the person, or such proceeding in
regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case,
the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the
owner of his property without due process of law, however obnox-
85 Boyd v. Selma, note 54, supra.
86 (1877) 96 U. S. 97, 24 L Ed. 616.
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ious it may be to other objections. It may violate some provisions
of the state constitution against unequal taxation; but the federal
Constitution places no restraints on the states in that regard."
Where Situs in Different States: When double taxation
results from the fact that personal property has a taxable situs
in more than one state the question becomes more complicated.
It then requires intervention by the federal courts or interstate
comity. Until recent years it was held that taxation of the same
property during the same year by more than one state was some-
thing which the federal courts were powerless to prevent. It
has also been held by a number of the state courts that this is not
double taxation ;87 but this distinction is one of form, not of sub-
stance. In substance it is double taxation, because the burden
upon the property is double, notwithstanding the fact that the pro-
visions in the state constitutions against double taxation are con-
strued to mean a duplication of burdens by the taxing authorities
of the same state. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States have now established the principle that where
tangible personal property is taxed at the place where it is per-
manently located, i. e., where it has a situs of its own, it cannot
be also taxed at the domicile of the owner in another state, but this
is because of a lack of jurisdiction of the state of the domicile,
rather than because it would result in double taxation. In Dela-
ware, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania,"8 decided in 1904; the court,
speaking through Justice Peckham, says: "It is plain that in the
case at bar the coal had lost its situs in Pennsylvania by being
transported from that state to foreign states for the purposes of
sale, with no intention that it should ever return to its state of
origin. Taxation of the coal in this case deprived the owner of its
property without due process of law, and the owner is entitled to
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents the
taking of its property in that way." This decision was approved
in Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky.88
This principle has not as yet been extended by the Supreme
Court to intangible personalty, and in Union Refrigerator Transit
87 Griggsby Constr. Co. v. Freeman, (1902) 108 La. 435, 32 So. 399,
58 L. R. A. 349.
88 (1905) 198 U. S. 341, 49 L. Ed. 1077, 25 S. C. R. 669.
89 (1906) 202 U. S. 409, 50 L. Ed. 1082, 26 S. C. R. 679.
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Co. v. Kentucky"0 it suggests the reason for not doing so: "There
is an obvious distinction between tangible and intangible property,
in that the latter is held secretly; that there is no method by which
its existence or ownership can be ascertained in the state of its
situs, except, perhaps, in the case of mortgages or shares of stock.
So, if the owner be discovered, there is no way by which he can
be reached by process in a state other than that of his domicile or
the collection of the tax otherwise enforced. In this class of cases
the tendency of modem authority is to follow the maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam." In Selliger v. Kentucky0 ' the court refused
to allow the taxation of warehouse receipts at the domicile of the
owner, where the tangible personal property for which they were
a receipt was outside the jurisdiction of the taxing state, which
meant that the situs for taxation of the receipt was the same as the
property and that taxing the property taxed the receipt. The
same had already been held with regard to bills of lading."2
The determination of situs of personal property where the
property is in one state and the owner in another is a subject
which for its satisfactory settlement requires an agreement
between the states. In other words, it is a question for settle-
ment by interstate comity, which would bring about the adoption
of a uniform rule throughout the United States, rather than for
each state to adopt whatever rule seems necessary in order to
give it the largest possible amount of property subject to taxation
by it. The fact that absolute justice and equality can never be
reached in taxation ought not to discourage the attempt to make
reasonable efforts to remove manifest evils.
EDWIN MAXEY.
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.
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